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I

INTRODUCTION
Legal history has been a required first-year class at the University
of New Mexico School of Law since 1987, when I joined the faculty
to develop such a course. Initially entitled "Historical Introduction
to Law," the course reflected its title: an initial exposure to the historical context of the common law. Gradually, however, the course's
focus evolved and by 1996 it was renamed "Comparative and Historical Legal Perspectives," or CHLP, to reflect a broader orientation
of the legal system. While still providing historical context, CHLP is
intended to help the entering class develop effectiveness and proficiency as law students and ultimately as lawyers.
II
"LEARNING TO THINK LIKE A LAWYER"
Although the readings in CHLP are very different from what students use to learn "the law" in their other first year classes, I argue
that the course isdirectly relevant to their study and practice of law.
I seek to advance this practical objective by using two approaches.
The first approach is to help students develop an appreciation of
the intrinsic nature, characteristics, and particularities of the common law tradition. Law students are told that the principal objective
of their training and education is to be able "to think like a lawyer."
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While this platitude has some truth, it is, of course, not strictly accurate. More precisely, American law students are being taught "to
think like a (common law) lawyer." A reminder that the legal system
for which students are being trained is derived from a particular
legal tradition underscores the easily-overlooked fact that there are
significantly different understandings of the nature of "law" and the
role for lawyers and judges within a host of other cultures and legal
traditions.
For law students, acquiring the capacity to "think like a lawyer"
in the common law tradition is akin to developing fluency in a new
and complex language. The ability to communicate effectively and
persuasively rests on a mastery of vocabulary, grammar, and syntax,
as well as an appreciation of subtleties of pronunciation, context,
dialects, and specialized argot. CHLP challenges students to immerse themselves and develop a sophisticated understanding of
the conventions and byways of the particular legal culture within
which American lawyers and judges operate.
The second approach in helping students develop into effective
legal practitioners involves instilling a critical and self-conscious
methodology to the study and understanding of law. Such a perspective is needed to resist the tendency of students to take what
they are encountering for granted, as though it was inevitable and
inexorable. I offer the metaphor that first year law students (under
the conventional pedagogy followed by most American law schools)
are dropped into an ocean of "law" where they quickly encounter
a bewildering array of strange denizens in that watery legal world
and in which they are largely left to their own devices to navigate
and understand. As sentient creatures, law students know they have
been dropped in this ocean, but there is a strong tendency to lose
sight of this fact and begin to take the process of legal education
and the content of law at face value.
CHLP challenges students to become "flying fish" who rise above
the legal sea they find themselves in and attain a critical perspective
from which they are encouraged to ask what they are doing in their
other first year classes, how they are doing it, and why they are
doing it. In addition to remaining critical consumers of their legal
education, students are urged to embrace the central insight and
legacy of legal realism: that legal rules and doctrines are not inevitable and that law rests on underlying and often implicit assump-

tions; reflects particular values; and ultimately is a construct that
is shaped rather than something that is inexorably or neutrally
developed.

III
READINGS
CHLP seeks to advance these objectives in five interrelated units
of readings. The first unit provides an overview of the common law
and civil law tradition and starts with three appellate judicial opinions drawn from the highest civil court in France, the highest civil
court in Germany, and from the Michigan Supreme Court. All three
courts address an identical issue (the tort principle of joint and several liability) and each reaches the same result in applying the principle. Even so, the judicial opinions look very different. I ask the
students to think of the judicial opinions as "artifacts" of the legal
systems that produced them-the first two from the civil law tradition and the last from the common law tradition. The opinions vary
dramatically in terms of length, sources of law, and the nature of
judicial persona and argumentation. These differences invite an exploration of how the history and nature of the civil law tradition
helps account for the shape of the French and German opinions.
Although the first unit serves to introduce students to the civil
law tradition, the ostensible purpose of the comparative approach
is to highlight features of the Michigan decision that underscore
characteristics of the common law approach to judicial law-making
that might otherwise be taken for granted. The Michigan case
serves as a typical example of the appellate opinions that form the
staple of what students are reading for their other classes, but
which allows them to reflect upon how the American opinion suggests a different world view of the nature of law and the legitimate
sources of law.
Unit two turns to selected aspects of the history of the common
law tradition, including the unification of law in England through
the rise of the royal courts operating under the writ system and the
emergence of the court of Chancery, along with the legacy of the
law/equity distinction and the ultimate procedural "merger" of the
two. The readings dealing with medieval English legal developments
and American law reform in the 19th century do not pretend to

offer an overview of English and American legal history. Rather, they
serve as a means through which students can identify contributing
factors that have shaped the common law tradition and given it particular characteristics and features. The comparison of the three judicial opinions that began the class continues to provide benefits
as students are able to identify further parallels between the Michigan opinion and the appellate opinions they are studying in the context of being introduced to criminal law, torts, and contracts.
Unit three, "The Role of Law and Lawyers," shifts gears by introducing some "non-Western" concepts of law, including dimensions
of Chthonic legal traditions and Navajo justice concepts. The unit
offers the opportunity to see commonalities between the common
law and civil law traditions (despite the distinctions prompted by a
comparison of the traditions in unit one) in contradistinction with
other cultural contexts in which the meaning of "law" and the role
of lawyers-if any-is rather different from what those working
within both the common law and civil law traditions might take for
granted. This third unit also explores expectations about law and
lawyers in the American common law tradition, the contours of an
ideology of advocacy, and the broad trends in the rise of "Alternative Dispute Resolution." Just as cultural understandings about the
nature of "law" shape the potential role for lawyers, that understanding obviously underlies how law is taught.
Unit four turns to the question that first semester law students
invariably ask: where did the pedagogy for legal education that they
are experiencing come from? The unit permits a brief exploration
of the arc of legal education from a practical, apprentice-based approach exemplified by training in the Inns of Court and by "reading
law" to a combination of academic study and apprenticeships to
Christopher Columbus Langdell's concept of law as a "science." Exploring the rise of the modern law school in terms of the study of
law introduced with Langdell's deanship at Harvard in 1870 helps
satisfy the curiosity of students about the birth of the "Socratic
method." At the same time, that story permits an introduction of a
jurisprudential perspective of American law by exploring the premises, methods, and purposes of Langdell's legal education. The philosophy and understanding of law that underlay Langdell's
"revolution" in legal education set the stage for the ultimate rejection of "Langdellism" in the critiques of the Legal Realists.

IV
CONCLUSION
The final unit of the course, "Changing Perceptions of Law in
America," traces the emergence of the Legal Realists and some of
their intellectual heirs, including Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Jurisprudence, and Critical Race Theory. Whether students find these
approaches compelling is beside the point; all I hope to do is challenge them to think about law critically and to examine what has
shaped law and the legal system. If students leave the course and
become more like "flying fish," then the course has done its job.

